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TRADEMARK LAW-LANHAM TRADEMARK ACT OF
1946-TRADEMARK REGISTRATION-The United States Supreme
Court held that when a color meets the ordinary requirements of
a trademark, there is no special rule preventing color alone from
serving as a trademark.
Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
Qualitex Co. ("Qualitex") has manufactured and sold press
pads for use in the dry cleaning and garment manufacturing
industries since approximately 1957.1 For over thirty years
Qualitex used the same unique green-gold colored fabric on its
press pads.2 In 1989, Jacobson Products Co. ("Jacobson") began
selling press pads in a similar green-gold color? Qualitex
subsequently registered the green-gold color as a trademark in
the United States Patent and Trademark Office on February 5, 1991.
1. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 1300, 1302 (1995). A
press pad is a cover used on a dry cleaning press. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products
Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1300 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
2. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
3. Id.
4. Id. The Qualitex green-gold color was registered as a trademark in the
United States Patent and Trademark Office as Registration No. 1,633,711. Id. A
trademark is "a distinctive mark of authenticity, through which the products of par-
ticular manufacturers or the vendible commodities of particular merchants may be
distinguished from those of others." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1493 (6th ed. 1990).
Trademark law protects the first user to place goods bearing a mark in commerce
and does not require exclusive use of the mark at the time of registration. See Jew-
el Cos. v. The Westhall Co., 413 F. Supp. 994, 1000 (N.D. Ohio 1976) (arguing first
users' rights should be protected out of a sense of fairness). The Supreme Court
followed the rule set forth in Jewel, and thus Qualitex's registration of its green-gold
color in 1991 was valid, although registration occurred two years after Jacobson
began using the same color on its press pads. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct at 1308.
The United States Patent and Trademark Office is:
A federal agency in the Department of Commerce headed by the Commissioner
of Patents and Trademarks. In addition to the examination of patent and
trademark applications, issuance of patents, and registration of trademarks,
the Patent and Trademark Office (PTO) sells printed copies of issued docu-
ments; records and indexes documents transferring ownership; maintains* over
20 million documents, including U.S. and foreign patents and U.S. trademarks;
provides search rooms for the public to research their applications; hears and
decides appeals from prospective inventors and trademark applicants; partici-
pates in legal proceedings involving the issue of patents or trademark registra-
tions; helps represent the United States in international efforts to cooperate on
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Qualitex's purchasers primarily recognize its press pads
because of their distinctive green-gold color.' Qualitex achieved
this recognition through the expenditure of approximately
$1,621,000 over a thirty-year period in advertisements to the dry
cleaning and garment manufacturing industries stressing the
color of its press pads.' Over a thirty year period, Qualitex sold
more than one million green-gold press pads and acquired a
reputation for making the best press pads in the business.!
Until Jacobson began using the green-gold color on its press
pads in 1989, only Qualitex had used a similar color.8 Because
of Qualitex's exclusive use of the green-gold color and its
extensive advertising, segments of the press pad market had
grown to identify Qualitex press pads almost exclusively by their
color.9 Certain purchasers even ordered press pads by telephone
simply by describing the pads' color.1°  Through public
identification of Qualitex with green-gold colored pads, Qualitex
had developed secondary meaning in the green-gold color.11
The Supreme Court adopted the district court's findings of fact
with regard to Jacobson's use of the same green-gold color used
on Qualitex press pads." The district court found that
Jacobson's inferior quality press pads were sold through the
same distributors as the Qualitex press pads and created a
patent and trademark policy; compiles the Official Gazettes-a weekly list of
all patents and trademarks issued by the PTO; and maintains a roster of
agents and attorneys qualified to practice before the PTO.
BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 1126 (6th ed. 1990).
5. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304-05. The District Court for the Central District
of California found that "most dry cleaning businesses are small, family owned, and
family run establishments, many of whom are foreign speaking with limited skills in
reading or speaking English," therefore, it was important that non-English speaking
customers be able to identify Qualitex press pads simply by color. Qualitex Co. v.
Jacobson Products Co., 21 U.S.P.Q.2d 1457, 1458 (C.D. Cal. 1991), rev'd, 13 F.3d
1297 (9th Cir. 1994), rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
6. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1458. Since at least 1970, Qualitex has featured
color advertisements of its press pads in the American Drycleaner Magazine, the
leading trade magazine. Id. Qualitex also advertises its green-gold press pads in
the Korean Drycleaners Times, the Drycleaners News, the Bobbin and other maga-
zines, distributes bulletins and flyers at trade shows and sends brochures and mail-
ers promoting the press pads' green-gold color. Id.
7. Id. Nineteen of twenty-two award winning dry cleaners used Qualitex
press pads for the last twenty years. Id. at 1459.
8. Id. at 1458.
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1458. Secondary meaning is acquired when, "in
the minds of the public, the primary significance of a product feature . . is to
identify the source of the product rather than the product itself." Inwood Labs., Inc.
v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 851 n.11 (1982).
12. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
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likelihood of confusion between Jacobson and Qualitex press
pads. 3  The district court further determined that this
confusion had the potential to cause purchasers who wished to
purchase Qualitex press pads to mistakenly purchase Jacobson
press pads, and thus unfairly take business away from
Qualitex." In addition to adopting the district court's findings,
the Supreme Court noted that an inferior quality product passed
off as a Qualitex product may also have caused Qualitex to lose
future sales because of a perceived lowering of product
standards. 5
Qualitex's green-gold color was found by the district court to
be a non-functional symbol of Qualitex in the press pad
industry." The district court noted that the color is specially
applied and is not the press pad material's natural and
functional yellowed off-white color. 7 The green-gold color, the
court reasoned, does not make the press pads perform better or
last longer and has no effect on the quality of the pads." The
court stated that while coloring of some sort makes the press
pads more pleasing in appearance, the green-gold shade is more
expensive than other colors. 9 The green-gold color, the court
opined, gives Qualitex no competitive advantage over other press
pad manufacturers except to identify the press pads' source as
Qualitex. ° The district court entered judgment against
Jacobson for infringement of Qualitex's registered trademark for
the green-gold color on its press pads and denied Jacobson's
counterclaim for cancellation of the registered green-gold
trademark."'
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed the judgment of
13. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459.
14. Id.
15. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303 (discussing the "financial [and] reputation-
related rewards associated with a desirable product").
16. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1461. A feature of goods is "non-functional" if it
does not affect their purpose, action of performance, or the facility or economy of pr-
ocessing, handling or using them. BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1654 (6th ed. 1990).
Functional features are protected by patent law and are not protected by trademark
law. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1461. Therefore, lack of functionality of the color
was a critical element in Qualitex's trademark suit. Id.
17. Qualitex, 21 U.S.P.Q.2d at 1459.
18. Id. at 1460. The district court found that the green-gold dye did not
make the press pads perform better or affect the quality or life of the pads. Id. The
district court also found that the green-gold dye was more expensive than other col-




21. Id. at 1462.
1996
Duquesne Law Review
the district court on Qualitex's trademark infringement claim on
the ground that there was a prohibition on the use of color alone
as a trademark." The court of appeals also reversed the
judgment against Jacobson on Jacobson's counterclaim for
cancellation of the trademark after determining that the
trademark was invalid and should be canceled.23 The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to resolve a
disagreement among the courts of appeal as to whether a color
may be recognized as a valid trademark.24
The United States Supreme Court unanimously reversed the
Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals on the issue of whether a
trademark may consist solely of a color and the Court reinstated
the district court's holding.2" Justice Breyer, writing for the
Court, discussed the Lanham Trademark Act's (the "Lanham
Act") requirements for a valid trademark." The Court first
stated that a trademark must be a "word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof."" The Court defined a
"symbol" or "device" as almost anything capable of carrying
meaning, including a color.28 The Court then discussed the
requirement that an entity attempting to protect its mark must
use, or intend to use, the mark to identify and distinguish its
goods.29 Finally, the Court examined a Lanham Act condition
that requires that a mark must have achieved secondary
meaning if it is not fanciful, arbitrary, or suggestive." The
22. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 13 F.3d 1297, 1305 (9th Cir. 1994),
rev'd, 115 S. Ct. 1300 (1995).
23. Qualitex, 13 F.3d at 1305.
24. Qualitex Co. v. Jacobson Products Co., 115 S. Ct. 40 (1994) (granting cer-
tiorari).
25. "Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
26. Id. at 1302. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994). See infra notes 75-82 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the Lanham Act.
27. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
28. Id. at 1302-03. A trademark may include "any word, name, symbol, or
device, or any combination thereof." 15 U.S.C. § 1127 (1994). Justice Breyer opined
that "[s]ince human beings might use as a 'symbol' or 'device' almost anything at all
that is capable of carrying meaning, this language, read literally, is not restrictive."
Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302-03. Justice Breyer cited as examples of valid trademark
symbols," cases in which "[t]he courts and Patent and Trademark Office have autho-
rized for use as a mark a particular shape (of a Coca-Cola bottle), a particular
sound (of NBC's three chimes), and even a particular scent (of plumeria blossoms on
sewing thread)." Id. at 1303.
29. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303.
30. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1052 (1994) (accepting exclusive and continuous use of
a mark for five years as prima facie evidence of distinctiveness on a particular prod-
uct). Fanciful or arbitrary marks are those that have no natural connection to the
product and are given the broadest protection as trademarks. Abercrombie & Fitch
Co. v. Hunting World, Inc., 537 F.2d 4, 11 (2d Cir. 1976). Suggestive marks require
imagination, thought and perception to make a connection between the mark and
Vol. 34:419
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Court concluded that a product's color could not be fanciful,
arbitrary, or suggestive and acquisition of secondary meaning
would have to be proven to establish a valid color trademark."
The Court next discussed the reason that trademark laws
exist. 2 Justice Breyer explained that trademarks benefit
consumers by making quality products easy to identify. 3 In
addition, Justice Breyer elucidated that trademarks benefit
manufacturers of quality products by assuring them that inferior
products will not be confused with their own.34 Justice Breyer
also discussed the Court's finding that trademark laws not only
encourage production of quality products, but also discourage
production of inferior products by making the origin of products
easy to determine, thereby reducing the need for purchasers to
quickly evaluate an item's quality.3 The. Court opined that the
source-distinguishing quality of trademarks permit trademarks
to serve these functions."
The Court noted the important requirement that trademarks
be nonfunctional and then discussed the functionality of color.37
Justice Breyer explained that functional features are protected
by patent laws which give a limited monopoly over qualifying
inventions to stimulate creation of new inventions and make
them public knowledge.38  Justice Breyer explained that
trademark laws, in contrast, seek only to protect a producer's
the nature of the product. Stix Products Inc. v. United Merchants & Mfrs. Inc., 295
F. Supp. 479, 488 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). Fanciful, arbitrary and suggestive marks require
no identification with the product by the public or secondary meaning because their
use with the product does not limit the terms available for use on similar products
by other suppliers. Abercrombie, 537 F.2d at 11. Descriptive marks describe the pro-
duct and, therefore, must have achieved secondary meaning or be recognized as a
product of a particular supplier to become valid trademarks that cannot be used by
other suppliers of similar goods. Id. at 10. Generic marks are marks that the public
associates with a type of product, not with a particular supplier of a product, and
cannot be protected as trademarks because to protect the mark would be to deprive
competitors of calling a product by its name. Id. at 9.
31. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303. See supra note 11 for a definition of "sec-
ondary meaning."




36. Id. at 1304.
37. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
38. Id. The Patent Act provides in relevant part: "Every patent shall con-
tain . . . a grant to the patentee, his heirs or assigns, for the term of seventeen
years . . . of the right to exclude others from making, using or selling the invention
throughout the United States." 35 U.S.C. § 154 (1988). The Patent Act further pro-
vides that "[p]atents for designs shall be granted for the term of fourteen years." Id.
§ 173.
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reputation and do so indefinitely. 9 Therefore, the Court opined
that trademark laws should not be permitted to grant a
monopoly over a functional feature beyond the limit of patent
laws.' The Court determined that a color is not functional
when it is not essential to a product and does not affect the
product's cost or quality. 1 Therefore, the Court concluded,
functionality could not always bar the use of color alone as a
trademark.42
The Court then determined that Qualitex's green-gold color
met all of the requirements of a trademark because it
symbolizes Qualitex, is used as a mark by Qualitex to
distinguish its goods from those of others, and is not
functional.43 The Court concluded that Qualitex's green-gold
color should, therefore, be protected as a trademark unless there
exists a convincing special reason that the color should not be
protected."
In determining whether there are any special reasons to not
protect color alone as a trademark, the Court first considered
whether there is an acceptable standard for determining
infringement." Justice Breyer stated that competitors and
courts would not have undue difficulty in determining what
shades might be confusingly similar to a color protected by a
trademark because different shades would be distinguishable
under constant lighting conditions. 6
The second special reason considered by the Court for not
39. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1304.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. To reinforce the Court's position, Justice Breyer revealed that the Pat-
ent and Trademark Office recognizes color alone as a trademark and brings this to
the attention of examiners in its procedure manual. Id. See U.S. DEP'T OF COM-
MERCE, PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE, TRADEMARK MANUAL OF EXAMINING PROCE-
DURE § 1202.04(e) (2d ed. 1993).
43. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. Id. The Supreme Court also opined that courts are faced with equally dif-
ficult determinations on matters such as distinguishing between color and symbol
combinations and therefore the courts should be capable of determining trademark
infringement of colors alone. Id. The Court endorsed the expansion of the "strong"
mark versus "weak" mark standard in determining whether a similar shade infringes
on a shade protected as a trademark. Id. The Court stated that arbitrary or fan-
ciful marks receive broad protection and may be protected where the risk of custom-
er confusion is small. Id. In Majestic Mfg. Co. v. Majestic Elec. Appliance Co., 172
F.2d 862 (6th Cir. 1949), the court stated that "where trade-marks are merely sug-
gestive or descriptive they are weak marks affording protection to the owners only




protecting color as a trademark was the concern that colors are
in limited supply and all colors could be depleted if a large
number of color trademarks are registered.47 The Court stated
that in situations where usable colors are limited, color becomes
a functional feature not protectable by trademark law because it
is essential to the product or affects product cost or quality."
The test given by the Court was that a color is functional when
it serves a significant non-trademark function." Justice Breyer
opined that the category of a significant non-trademark function
includes giving a product the "right touch of beauty."0 As an
example of a functional color, Justice Breyer cited a lower court
decision holding that a particular shade of green is functional
when placed on a loader designed to fit a tractor painted the
same shade of green as the loader because customers want their
equipment to match.5' The Court also cited a lower court
decision which held that the color black is functional when
placed on outboard boat motors because it decreases the
apparent size of the motor and matches a wide variety of boat colors.5"
47. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305.
48. Id. at 1305-06. The Court noted that one exception to the policy of per-
mitting trademark protection for a color occurs when medical pills are involved. Id.
at 1306. See Inwood Labs., Inc. v. Ives Labs., Inc., 456 U.S. 844, 853 (1982) (hold-
ing that colors on medical pills are functional for the public policy reason of identify-
ing the type of medication to doctors and patients and, therefore, may not be given
trademark protection).
49. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306.
50. Id. (citation omitted). The Court stated that "if a design's 'aesthetic value'
lies in its ability to 'confer a significant benefit that cannot practically be duplicated
by the use of alternative designs,' then the design is 'functional". Id. (citing RE-
STATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETITION § 17 cmt. c (1995)). The Court noted
that the Restatement also states that the "ultimate test of aesthetic functionality . .
• is whether the recognition of trademark rights would significantly hinder competi-
tion." Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 17 cmt. c (1995).
51. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306. See Deere & Co. v. Farmhand, Inc., 560 F.
Supp. 85, 98 (S.D. Iowa 1982), afftd, 721 F.2d 253 (8th Cir. 1983). In Deere, Deere
brought an unfair competition action against Farmhand, which produced front-end
loaders that were custom designed to fit Deere's tractors and that were similar in
appearance and color to Deere's loaders. Deere, 560 F. Supp at 88. The court found
that all similarities in appearance were necessitated by functional considerations. Id.
at 90-91. The court accepted the evidence that matching colors on loaders and trac-
tors was a significant criterion for selecting loaders. Id. at 97-98. This led the court
to conclude that the doctrine of "aesthetic functionality" required that Farmhand be
permitted to use the same shade of green on its loaders that Deere used on its
tractors. Id. at 98.
52. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1306. See Brunswick Corp. v. British Seagull Ltd.,
35 F.3d 1527, 1532 (Fed. Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 1426 (1995). In Bruns-
wick the court determined that the color black is de jure functional when applied to
an outboard boat motor, and therefore could not be protected as a trademark. Bruns-
wick, 35 F.3d at 1533. The court also determined that black outboard boat motors
are de jure functional because they provide a competitive advantage and therefore
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The Court found the third special reason for not allowing color
trademarks in pre-Lanham Act cases in which the Court opined
that color alone could not be protected by trademark law. 3 The
Court stated two reasons justifying its decision to overrule
precedent and allow colors to be registered as trademarks. 4
The Court stated that, although lower courts followed the rule
that color alone could not constitute a valid trademark, it was
merely dicta with regard to the Supreme Court. 5 Justice
Breyer further distanced the Court from pre-1946 cases by
stating that the Lanham Act made significant changes to
common law trademark law.56 The Court concluded that it was
following congressional intent by allowing color alone to be
registered as a trademark. 7
The Court stated that the fourth special reason for not
affording trademark protection of colors, the possibility of
duplicate protection already afforded by "trade dress" law is not
a valid concern.58 "Trade dress" law, the Court explained,
protects against confusingly similar colors applied to a symbolic
trademark.59 However, -trademark law does not protect color
alone and therefore does not protect manufacturers who find it
difficult to place a symbol on a product and thereby protect it.60
are not of purely aesthetic value. Id. Black coloring, according to the court, does not
make an engine function better but it makes the engine appear smaller and more
compatible with a wide variety of boat colors. Id. at 1531. The court indicated, how-
ever, that de facto functionality may be entitled to trademark protection. Id. As an
example of de facto functionality, the court suggested that a bottle has the de facto
function of holding a liquid but the shape may be protected as a trademark because
it does not offer superior utility over other shapes. Id.
53. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307.
54. Id.
55. Id. The Supreme Court suggested in Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of Am.,
254 U.S. 143, 147 (1920), that "product[s] including the coloring matter is free to all
who can make it." Coca-Cola, 254 U.S. at 147. Dicta are defined as "[o]pinions of a
judge which do not embody the resolution or determination of the specific case be-
fore the court. Expressions in court's opinion which go beyond the facts before the
court and therefore ...not binding in subsequent cases as legal precedent." BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 454 (6th ed. 1990).
56. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307. The Court stated that the Lanham Act
changed and liberalized the common law to "dispense with mere technical prohibi-
tions" by, for example, allowing registration of descriptive trademarks that had ac-
quired secondary meaning. Id. See S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 3 (1946),
reprinted in 1946 U.S.C.C.A.N. 412, 412.
57. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307-08.
58. Id. at 1308 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a) (1988 & Supp. V 1993)) Trade
dress is "[tihe total appearance and image of a product, including features such as
size, texture, shape, color or color combinations, graphics, and even particular adver-
tising and marketing techniques used to promote its sale." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1493 (6th ed. 1990).
59. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
60. Id.
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The Court concluded by specifically holding that the Lanham
Act does not prevent color alone from being registered as a
trademark when the color meets ordinary legal trademark
requirements."' Justice Breyer determined that Qualitex's use
of the green-gold color met the basic trademark requirements
and held that it was therefore a valid trademark registration. 2
Prior to the Lanham Trademark Act of 1946, the United
States Supreme Court considered whether a trademark could
consist of color alone in A. Leschen & Sons Rope Co. v. Broderick
& Bascom Rope Co.63 The A. Leschen & Sons Rope Company
("Leschen") claimed it had a trademark interest in rope because
a strand of the rope was colored differently from the other
strands.' The Court disagreed and held that Leschen's claim
was similar to claiming a trademark interest in coloring the
entire rope, which in the Court's opinion could not constitute a
valid trademark." The Court added that if color were to be
made an essential feature of a trademark, the color must be
connected with a symbol or design. 6 Although the claim in
Leschen was that Leschen had rights in a rope with any colored
strand and not a specific colored strand, lower courts relied on
the Supreme Court's dictum and interpreted the decision as not
allowing even a specific color to be used alone as a trademark
without an associated symbol.67
In Coca-Cola Co. v. Koke Co. of America,"s the Supreme
Court further emphasized its prohibition against color
trademarks.69 Koke Co. of America ("Koke") claimed that the
61. Id.
62. Id. According to the Court, Qualitex's green-gold color was a valid trade-
mark because it acted as a symbol, had acquired secondary meaning identifying the
press pads' source, and served no function other than to identify the source of the
press pads. Id. at 1305.
63. 201 U.S. 166, 172 (1906).
64. Leschen, 201 U.S. at 170. Leschen's trademark registration contained the
following description:
The trademark consists of a red or other distinctively colored streak applied to
or woven in a wire rope. The color of the streak may be varied at will, so
long as it is distinctive from the color and body of the rope. The essential
feature of the trademark is the streak of distinctive color produced in or ap-
plied to a wire rope. This mark is usually applied by painting one strand of
the wire rope a distinctive color, usually red.
Id.
65. Id.
66. Id. at 171.
67. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307. See Campbell Soup Co. v. Armour & Co., 175
F.2d 795, 798 (3d Cir. 1949) (declining to validate a trademark consisting of a red
and white label that was not combined with a distinctive design) (citing Leschen).
68. 254 U.S. 143 (1920).
69. Coca-Cola, 254 U.S. at 147.
1996
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Coca-Cola trademark was invalid.7 Koke asserted that Coca-
Cola had committed a fraud on the public by falsely implying
that there was cocaine, a byproduct of the coca plant, in Coca-
Cola's product.71 Justice Holmes, speaking for the Court, held
that the mark "Coca-Cola" was valid because it had achieved
secondary meaning identifying the source of a soft drink
generally known to contain no cocaine.72 In dictum, Justice
Holmes added that anyone was free to make the product at
issue, and specifically to use the coloring at issue, conditioned
only on there being no element of deceit involved.73 Justice
Holmes' dictum reinforced the Court's earlier dictum found in
Leschen which maintained that color alone could not constitute a
valid trademark.74
Common law trademark law was enhanced by the Lanham
Act.7" The Lanham Act did not preempt common law trademark
law but supplemented it through creation of a national principal
register.7" A mark may be nationally registered if it is shown
that it is used in or affects interstate commerce.77 Primarily,
national registration affords an owner of a mark protection
against other users of the mark anywhere in the United States,
assures registrants federal question jurisdiction, allows for
additional remedies, and creates a presumption that the
registered trademark is valid.7"
70. Id. at 144.
71. Id. at 145-46.
72. Id. at 146. See supra note 11 for a definition of "secondary meaning."
73. Coca-Cola, 254 U.S. at 147.
74. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1307.
75. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1994).
76. Macaulay v. Malt-Diatase Co., 4 F.2d 944, 945 (D.C. Cir. 1925). The Lan-
ham Act states: "The owner of a trademark used in commerce may apply to register
his or her trade-mark under this chapter on the principal register." 15 U.S.C. § 1051
(1994).
77. Macaulay, 4 F.2d at 945. "Congress can only exercise . .. authority over
trade-marks used on goods sold in interstate commerce." Id.
78. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1071, 1072, 1115, 1117 (1994). Registration is discussed in §
1072:
[Tihe Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1072, provides that registration of a trademark
on the principal register is constructive notice of the registrant's claim of own-
ership. Thus, by eliminating the defense of good faith and lack of knowledge,
§ 1072 affords nationwide protection to registered marks, regardless of the
areas in which the registrant actually uses the mark.
Dawn Donut Co. v. Hart's Food Stores, Inc., 267 F.2d 258, 362 (2d Cir. 1959). The
Lanham Act provides that anyone "who is dissatisfied with the decision of the Com-
missioner or Trademark Trial and Appeal Board, 'may' appeal to the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit." 15 U.S.C. § 1071 (1994). With regard to
remedies the Lanham Trademark Act provides:
[Tihe court shall . . . enter judgment for three times . . . profits or damages,
whichever is greater, together with a reasonable attorney's fee, in the case of
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In In re Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp.," the United States
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit reversed the United
States Patent and Trademark Office Trial and Appeal Board's
determination that the color "pink" could not be used as a
trademark on fiberglass insulation.0 The court explained that
the legislative history of the Lanham Act indicates that it was
created to dispense with mere technical prohibitions and
arbitrary provisions.8 The court then opined that the Lanham
Act was created to modernize trademark law so that it would
conform to legitimate present-day business practices. 2 The
Federal Circuit concluded that Owens-Coming Fiberglass
Corporation's ("Owens-Coming") "use of the color 'pink' performs
no non-trademark function, and is consistent with the
commercial and public purposes of trademarks.""3 Because
there are few fiberglass insulation manufacturers and changing
the natural color of fiberglass for sale is not a widespread
practice in the industry, the court reasoned that registration of
the color pink did not create a monopoly or restrict competitors
in a way that caused a competitive disadvantage." The court
held that the color pink on fiberglass insulation served only the
any violation . . .that consists of intentionally using a mark or designation,
knowing such mark or designation is a counterfeit mark, in connection with
the sale, offering for sale, or distribution of goods or services.
Id. § 1117(b). The Lanham Act also provides that "[any . .. mark registered on the
principal register . . . shall be prima facie evidence of the validity of the registered
mark." Id. § 1115.
79. 774 F.2d 1116 (Fed Cir. 1985)
80. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1128.
81. Id. at 1119. The court in Owens-Corning made the following statement re-
garding the Lanham Act's purpose to dispense with technical prohibitions and arbi-
trary provisions:
The Lanham Act provides national protection of trademarks in order to secure
to the owner of the mark the good will of his business and to protect the
ability of consumers to distinguish among competing producers. Section 45 of
the Act defines "trademark" to include "any word, name, symbol, or device or
any combination thereof adopted and used by a manufacturer or merchant to
identify his goods and distinguish them from those manufactured or sold by
others." This was a departure from the past, as prior statutes only permitted
registration of "technical" common law trademarks. The preamble of section 2
of the Lanham Act states that "[nio trademark . . .shall be refused registra-
tion on the principal register on account of its nature," unless one or more
specific exceptions to registrability set forth in that section apply. Color is not
such an exception. Congress intended, as shown in the legislative history of
the Lanham Act, a broad revision of trademark law achieving "substantive as
distinguished from merely procedural rights in trade-marks."
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 1333, 79th Cong., 2d Sess. 5 (1946), reprinted in 1946
U.S.C.C.AN. 1274, 1277).
82. Id.
83. Id. at 1123.
84. Id. at 1122.
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trademark function of indicating the origin of the insulation, had
no utilitarian use and offered no economies in manufacture or
use.85 Therefore, the court concluded that the color pink served
only to protect the public by distinguishing Owens-Corning's
insulation and was thus a valid trademark.86
In NutraSweet Co. v. Stadt Corp., the issue of whether color
alone could be a valid registered trademark was brought before
the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals.8 The Seventh Circuit
distinguished the Federal Circuit's Owens-Corning decision and
concluded that the Owens-Corning opinion was narrowly tailored
and could not be extended for three reasons. 9 First, the
Seventh Circuit was reluctant to overturn the commonly
accepted precedent relied on by many courts since the
nineteenth century that color alone could not serve as a valid
trademark."0 Second, the court interpreted the Lanham Act as
protecting color only if it is used in connection with a symbol or
design.9 Finally, the court opined that the NutraSweet case
"degenerated into" an issue of dissension about different pastel
blue color tones.92 The court explained that determination of
whether shades are confusingly similar would require a trial
court to determine the number of competitors and the likelihood
of future competitors in the market in order to determine
whether there is a competitive need for the color blue to remain
available for all to use.9 This standard, the court concluded,
would prove unworkable because it requires a court to predict
the future and could have the effect of restricting new
competition in the artificial sweetener market. 4
85. Owens-Corning, 774 F.2d at 1122.
86. Id. at 1123.
87. 917 F.2d 1024 (7th Cir. 1990).
88. NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1025.
89. Id. at 1027.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id. NutraSweet uses the color blue on its single serving packets of artifi-
cial sweetener called "Equal" to distinguish it from "Sweet 'N Low" which is
wrapped in pink packets, and sugar which typically comes in white packets. Id. at
1026. Stadt Corporation and Cumberland Packing Corporation later introduced a new
artificial sweetener called "Sweet One" in blue single serving packages. Id.
NutraSweet claimed that the color of the "Sweet One" packages was "confusingly
similar" to the color of the "Equal" packages although the shades of blue were differ-
ent. Id. NutraSweet further claimed that customers would mistakenly use "Sweet
One" when they intended to use "Equal" because of the confusingly similar package
colors. Id. at 1027-28. Therefore, NutraSweet asked the court to grant it sole use in
the sweetener market of the color blue used on "Equal," and any other shades that
are confusingly similar. Id. at 1025.




In its Qualitex holding, the United States Supreme Court
established that companies may use a color as a trademark in
instances when it is difficult to place a symbol on the product
and when the color is not functional.95 The Court's decision
allows for legitimate protection of companies producing high
quality products.
The Qualitex decision is not a leap of common sense widely
heralded as overdue, nor is it, a foolish leap from a precedent
created more than one hundred years ago. It is a small step in
the advancement of trademark law and a decision of limited
applicability that will not soon be overturned.
Many of the arguments used against color trademarks in the
past remain applicable in Ithe post-Qualitex world. However,
these arguments will nowl be based on the central idea of
functionality. 6 Opponefits of color trademarks will argue that
color is necessary to make a product attractive and that the
color used and those that are confusingly similar to it detract
substantially from the limited number of usable colors." If a
court can be so convinced, it will be forced to determine that
color is functional because granting exclusive rights to the color
will limit competition in the product's market." This argument
will be most convincing if the color used is a primary color and
the market is one in which there could be many competitors.9
Even if the trademark opponent is unsuccessful in arguing that
the trademark will infringe on the limited number of usable
colors, the trademark opponent may have established that the
color mark is not inherently distinctive, placing a heavy burden
on the proponent of the trademark to prove it has acquired
secondary meaning."° If a trial court can be convinced either
that the color is functional or it has not acquired secondary
meaning, the trademark will be invalid.1"'
The proponent of a color trademark will argue that the color
in question is not functional because its removal from general
use does not substantially reduce the spectrum of colors
available to competitors, that the color is distinctive in that
there is no necessity or competitive advantage obtained by using
the color, and that the color has acquired secondary
95. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1308.
96. See id. at 1306-07 (discussing the functionality of colors).
97. See id. (discussing the aesthetic functionality of colors).
98. Id. at 1304.
99. See id. at 1306 (suggesting that when color depletion arises, the doctrine
of functionality will prevent the color from being a valid trademark).
100. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1303.
101. Id. at 1303-04.
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meaning." After arguing non-functionality and secondary
meaning, the proponent will argue the strength of the mark as
would be done in any other trademark case. °3 The strength of
the mark is important because a stronger mark will be protected
against a wider spectrum of confusingly similar colors."° While
the framework for arguing the validity of color trademarks is
clear, the standards by which the worthiness of protection are
judged are not clear and will be applied differently by trial
courts.
Determination of whether a color should be protected as a
trademark is a fact intensive question.' Color trademark
suits will turn on subjective decisions. The validity of a color
trademark will depend on whether the usable colors are more
limited than the number of potential producers and whether the
coloring is required to give the product the "right touch of
beauty" or has been added arbitrarily to distinguish the
product's source." Once validity is determined, infringement
will turn on factors including whether the shades are
confusingly similar and how strongly the public associates a
color with the producer of the colored item.0 7
This fact intensiveness is an important factor in appellate
review. Broad deference is extended to fact-finders because
appellate courts can only review the record from the trial while
fact-finders have firsthand opportunity to evaluate exhibits,
witnesses and testimony. Because appellate courts can only
access the facts of a case indirectly through the record and do
not have direct access to pertinent information, appellate courts
are limited to overturning a fact-finder's decision only when
plain error is committed.' Therefore, the opportunity for
appellate courts to refine the standard set forth in Qualitex will
be unusually limited, thus allowing fact-finders to stray
unchecked into the margins allowed by the vague standard set
102. See id. at 1306-07 (discussing the functionality of colors).
103. See id. at 1305 (opining that the strength of a color mark is an important
consideration in determining whether another shade is confusingly similar).
104. Id.
105. NutraSweet, 917 F.2d at 1028.
106. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1305-06.
107. Id. at 1305.
108. The Supreme Court, in Citizens To Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402 (1971), stated with regard to overturning a fact-finder's determination:
To make this finding the court must consider whether the decision was based
on a consideration of the relevant factors and whether there has been a clear
error of judgment. Although this inquiry into the facts is to be searching and
careful, the ultimate standard of review is a narrow one.




The strategy of bringing in evidence for the record, therefore,
will be of little value in color trademark cases. Winning a case
with a well organized fact-intensive argument in a trial court
will be of overriding importance.
Litigants should also question the necessity of a court
applying the decision in Qualitex to a case. The dearth of past
cases has left it unclear when it is necessary to allow
trademarks to consist of colors not associated with symbols. It
could be argued that designs, textures or symbols could readily
be incorporated into products even though the Qualitex Court
determined that combining colors with designs is
unnecessary."9 It should be argued by future color trademark
opponents that a particular mark could have been easily
combined with a symbol and the broader protection of the color
with or without a symbol should, therefore, be invalidated as
over broad."0
The former rule requiring a combination of a symbol or design
with a color provided courts with more factors to weigh when
deciding whether trademarks are confusingly similar and
whether the confusion is intentional. However, the advantages
for courts were minor and the burden on industry to combine
more elements in trademarks could be substantial."'
The Qualitex decision is a practical solution which
acknowledges modern advertising's legitimate goal of quick,
simple product identification. Advances in the law are often
followed by periods of upheaval and uncertainty but trademark
law has, and must continue to advance at a rapid pace or it will
109. Qualitex, 115 S. Ct. at 1302.
110. See id. at 1308 (qualifying the narrow holding in Qualitex by stating: "[A]
color may sometimes meet the basic legal requirements for a trademark" and adding
that "a special legal rule preventing color alone from serving as a trademark" is not
justified) (emphasis added).
111. See id. at 1305. The Court discussed the strength of the mark standard,
stating: "We do not see why courts could not apply those standards to a color, repli-
cating, if necessary, lighting conditions under which a colored product is normally
sold. Indeed courts already have done so in cases where a trademark consists of a
color plus a design." Id. (citing as examples: Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v:
Tallman Conduit Co., 149 U.S.P.Q. 656, 657 (T.T.A.B. 1966) (validating a trademark
consisting of a gold stripe around a sewer pipe), Amsted Indus., Inc. v. West Coast
Wire Rope & Rigging Inc., 2 U.S.P.Q.2d 1755, 1760 (T.T.A.B. 1987) (validating a yel-
low strand as a trademark in a wire rope) and In re Hodes-Lange Corp., 167




be disregarded as obsolete. Therefore, it is time that colors be
allowed to join shapes, sounds and scents, as symbolic marks
that may stand independently as trademarks.11
Richard W. James
112. See id. at 1303. See also United States Patent and Trademark Office Reg-
istration Nos. 696,147, 523,616 and 916,522.
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